




he impact of economic performance on
perceptions of economic and social
well-being and attitudes toward redis-
tribution in Canada is an intimidatingly
broad topic. There are really two basic and
quite separate questions: how does the public
see the performance of the economy, and how
does the performance of the economy influ-
ence attitudes toward redistribution?
We will begin by considering the basic
terms of the first question. What do we mean
by economic performance? Are we referring to
GDP, job creation, standard of living, unem-
ployment or wealth creation? Clearly, each of
these disparate dimensions of the economy
refers to some important aspect of economic
performance. Moreover, “the public” is hardly
a monolith and the perception of the different
dimensions of the economy will vary signifi-
cantly according to one’s location in society.
Moving from the official economic
world of GDP, or productivity and unem-
ployment rates, we enter the decidedly
murkier realm of public perception. We care-
fully use the term “official” rather than objec-
tive economy to point out that an official sta-
tistical description of economic reality is not
necessarily the ultimate criterion, or ultimate
truth. While official statistics are clearly more
scientific than public perceptions, public per-
ceptions are not always “wrong” just because
they are not synchronized with official statis-
tics. For example, official unemployment rates
seriously understated real unemployment in
the mid-1990s (e.g., due to the high inci-
dence of discouraged workers).
Although the social science literature is
not entirely consistent on this point, it does sug-
gest that there is a close relationship between
perceived and “real” economic indicators, and
that public opinion concerning the economy
bears a close relationship to what is actually hap-
pening in the economy (i.e., public opinion mir-
rors economic indicators such as unemployment
and inflation).1 However, Canadians’ views of
economic performance are, at times, only loose-
ly connected to objective accounts of the “offi-
cial” economy. Repeatedly, respondents to social
surveys and participants in focus groups stren-
uously question the veracity/meaning of “objec-
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Most people believe that social well-being is
a much broader and more elusive concept
that includes both equality and wealth and a
host of other non-economic factors (e.g.,
human rights and freedoms, environmental
quality, health outcomes, security from crime
and violence).4 In fact, one of the most basic
public policy dilemmas is the relative impor-
tance and trade-off of the economic and social
dimensions of well-being.5 We will comment
later on a growing tendency for the public to
explicitly connect the social and economic
realms of well-being.
The literature suggests that it is often
hard to separate out the specific factors that
cause shifts in public opinion. Public opin-
ion on social issues differs from that on other
kinds of issues (Page and Sharpiro 1992). As
a result, the nature of the interplay between
social indicators and economic growth, for
example, is not well understood (Krause
1997; Fedderke and Klitgaard 1998). While
it seems clear that stability of public institu-
tions, stability of political regimes and level
of rights play a definite role in economic
growth, the same cannot be said for other
social indicators or values — that is, those
that are more closely linked to “quality of
life.”6
This leads to the final area of discussion
implied by our topic. What is the relation-
ship between perceived economic perform-
ance and attitudes toward redistribution? At
the most basic level, does a sense that the
economy is performing well make the pub-
lic more or less supportive of the distributive
role of the State? While we can provide some
answers to this narrow question, it becomes
more meaningful when set against a broader
question: how do changes in perceived eco-
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Our data show that during the second
half of the 1990s we noticed a significant lag
between recovery of economic confidence
among consumers/citizens and apparent
recovery of the objective economy. Also, our
research with focus groups showed a broad
tendency to discount the legitimacy of many
conventional measures of economic perform-
ance. For instance, very few Canadians
believe that the unemployment rate is an
accurate measure of the real extent of unem-
ployment. It is our sense that the gap,
volatility and lag factors were especially pro-
nounced (in both qualitative and quantita-
tive evidence) during the middle part of the
1990s. These vagaries in public perception
are not simply a function of low levels of eco-
nomic literacy, although this factor certainly
accounts for a good deal of the tension
between official and public accounts of the
economy.
It should also be recognized that per-
ceived economic performance is segmented
according to the social and economic circum-
stances of the perceiver. Typically, affluent and
educated members of society are more likely
to be aware of and agree with economists’
accounts of economic performance.2 In
Canada, governments typically lose the sup-
port of public opinion during economic hard
times and see a less dramatic return of support
when economic good times return (Clarke et
al. 1992b)3 (although our own analysis shows
that economic optimism is a consistent, strong
and significant predictor of support for the
incumbent government).
This article focuses not only on eco-
nomic well-being but also on social well-
being. This expanded focus presents a
daunting problem. Economic performance as
it translates into standard of living is only
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role of the State? In particular, how have
shifts in attitudes toward the economy and
economic performance affected public sup-
port for the achievement of social progress
through State intervention?
To simply look at attitudes toward (for
example) taxation, social assistance or region-
al transfer payments is to miss the point that
these views are modified by fundamental
shifts in attitudes towards the role of the
State. Moreover, we are witnessing a broad
historical transformation in the role of the
State concerning its economic and social
functions. There is a voluminous literature
on these shifts in attitude.7 Furthermore, our
internal research confirms the broad finding
that both trust in and support for govern-
ment in its “passive” redistributive role have
declined over the past 20 years. Declining
support for the welfare state has, however,
been somewhat overstated. In fact this sup-
port has been disguised by a shift in strate-
gies for achieving social well-being. For
instance, support for social assistance has
been replaced by support for “active
measures” (e.g., skills investment, self-
employment assistance, early-childhood
intervention) to deal with some of the very
same social and economic issues.8 Focusing
merely on redistribution may serve to
occlude the more fundamental question of
the role of government in achieving social
progress and improved quality of life.
Public attitudes toward change, inno-
vation and technology have undergone pro-
found shifts. These shifts are linked to the
emergence of globalization and the new econ-
omy and are producing significant pressure
on State/economy/society linkages, with out-
comes that are still highly uncertain. In fact,
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the cumulative evidence suggests that the
past decade has seen complex structural
changes in public attitudes towards the State,
the economy and social well-being, and that
these changes are both driving and reflecting
shifts in the institutional spheres (Graves and
Reed 1999).9
Although we have set our problem
against a complex historical backdrop, our
intentions in this brief discussion are quite
modest. We will attempt to shed some pre-
liminary empirical light on the matter based
on ongoing research at EKOS (EKOS
Research Associates 1997). We will provide a
largely descriptive synthesis of some of our
main conclusions. Our focus will be on four
core questions:
1.  What is the relationship between pub-
lic perceptions of economic perform-
ance and the broad statistical
performance of the Canadian economy?
(Our focus will be on the areas of pro-
ductivity/growth, employment and
income levels.)
2.  What is the relationship between eco-
nomic and social well-being? (Our
focus will be on public perceptions of
this relationship.)
3.  How has national economic perform-
ance (both statistical and perceived)
influenced attitudes toward redistrib-
ution in Canada?
4.  How has economic performance influ-
enced broader attitudes toward active
government involvement in the
achievement of social progress?
The literature on the relationship
between the official economy and the per-
ceived economy is quite mixed in its conclu-
sions but tends to agree that there is a
discernible imperfect relationship between
graves.qxd  24/05/01  10:00 AM  Page 65the economy was perceived as considerably
more turbulent than it was, particularly in
the middle part of the decade. It was also
perceived as failing to strengthen for a sig-
nificant period while it was in fact growing.
Both of these phenomena were most evident
in the middle part of the decade.
Before considering public perceptions,
we present three statistical economic indica-
tors for the three domains of economic per-
formance noted in our first core question —
unemployment rate, real GDP growth and
real per capita personal disposable income
(Charts 1, 2, and 3).
While the nomenclature of the eco-
nomic realm remains mysterious for many
Canadians, the core concepts of these three
indicators are seen as having a “real world”
impact and meaning. We have also added a
measure of inequality (the inequality ratio)
(Chart 4), which, although not directly a
measure of economic performance, is ger-
mane to our discussion.
The charts clearly show that unem-
ployment has fallen steadily since the early
1990s recession, that economic growth has
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the two. It also speaks of lags between eco-
nomic shifts and public perceptions of those
shifts. Some public perceptions may in fact
precede changes and even influence the
“objective” economy. For example, in the
United States the Conference Board’s
Consumer Confidence Index fell for the fifth
consecutive month beginning in October
2000 (Conference Board 2001). These
declines in consumer confidence actually pre-
date, or at least are contemporaneous with, a
real slowing of the American economy
(Greenspan spoke of zero growth in January
2001). In the case of consumer confidence,
public perceptions certainly do not lag
behind the official economy and may well
lead economic performance. This, however,
is not a central question for our analysis.
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: 
THE PAST DECADE IN REVIEW
The public view of the Canadian econ-
omy is quite different from the official sta-
tistical record, although there is an imperfect
relationship between the two. In the 1990s
CHART 1
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Note: Annual percentage change, quarter to quarter, in
gross domestic product at market prices, in constant
1992 dollars.
Source: Statistics Canada.
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increased since the mid-1990s and that real
per capita disposable income increased
throughout the 1990s. Chart 4 indicates,
however, that, despite this rosy economic pic-
ture, income inequality rose in the latter part
of the decade, implying that the fruits of the
good economic performance observed were
not well distributed. Moreover, it should be
noted that in the latter part of 2000 the
economy showed signs of slowing down,
reflected in flattening growth in the GDP
and little change in the unemployment rate.
As well, recent news about an anticipated
recession south of the border may soon be
manifested in the indicators in Canada.
The Perceptual Indicators
EKOS has conducted interviews with
hundreds of thousands of Canadians over the
past 20 years, and our databases contain hun-
dreds of variables germane to the topics at hand.
While we will use other variables later in this
article, we begin our examination of the past
decade by tracking three variables — fear of job
loss (Chart 5), sense of loss of control over one’s eco-
nomic future (Chart 6) and views on the
strength of the Canadian economy (Table 1).
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Our time series for fear of job loss and
sense of loss of control are much more complete.
We also have the advantage of some new
(January 2001) data that allow us to evaluate
whether the pervasive media discussion of an
impending downturn, slowdown or recession
(particularly as it applies to the American
economy) has broadly influenced economic
security amongst Canadians.
The charts show different aspects of the
same story. First of all, insecurity declined in
the latter part of the decade in a highly sig-
nificant manner. The personal security indi-
cators fear of job loss (Chart 5) and sense of loss
of control (Chart 6) both dropped by nearly
half. Similarly, perceptions of an improving
overall economy shifted from a slight bet-
ter:worse ratio of 45:31 in 1996 to a defini-
tive 56:19 ratio in May 2000 (Table 1).
Another important characteristic of our
security indicators is the high degree of seg-
mentation in these responses by region and
socio-economic status (Charts 7 and 8).
Fear of job loss and broader insecurity
are higher amongst less-educated and lower-
income groups. Comparing the underlying
CHART 3
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Note: Computed as the ratio of the average after tax
income of top quintile to the bottom quintile of eco-
nomic family units.
Source: Statistics Canada.
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we find that the education effect is stronger
today than it was in 1994, suggesting that
the new economy is placing a greater accent
on human capital.
There are also sizeable regional, gen-
erational and gender effects. Also, today’s
regional patterns are quite different from
those of 1994. Otherwise the underlying
demographic correlates of insecurity are fair-
ly stable. Economic security is strongly
linked to expectations of government in a
manner that we will explore in the final sec-
tion of this article.
A direct comparison of official eco-
nomic indicators and their (roughly)
corresponding attitudinal indicator is prob-
lematic, largely because of issues relating to
timing. While figures on expenditure-based
GDP growth are released quarterly and fre-
quently revised, we have asked Canadians
about their sense of control over their eco-
nomic futures irregularly and at different
times. Nevertheless, there is merit in direct-
ly examining two variables — the unem-
ployment rate and the fear of job loss expressed
by employed Canadians (Chart 9).
While objective and subjective meas-
ures display the same general downward
trend, there are important discrepancies
between them. First of all, fear of job loss actu-
ally rose between early 1994 and April 1996,
while the unemployment rate dropped from
10 to 9 percent. This was followed by some
volatility until 1998, when fear of job loss
started dropping in closer alignment to
reduced unemployment. The perceptual data
show volatility in the views of Canadians that
is not evident in the unemployment rate.
This is particularly true of the 1996-98 peri-
od, when Canadians were, it seems, highly
uncertain about whether the recovery was
real. We will comment on this “unhinged”
quality later. Although both job and broader
economic security indicators are volatile, the
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CHART 6
Perceived Loss of Control Over Personal
Economic Future
Percentage of Canadians agreeing with the
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reflect public anxiety about not only the
labour market but also the broader vagaries
of interest rates, public finances, domestic
and global stock markets and currency rates.
We would also argue that the sharp
reduction on this indicator reflects not only
differences in the business cycle but also
structural shifts as the economy moved to
greater dependence on technology and as
north-south trade grew much more rapidly
than east-west trade. Globalism, trade liber-
alization and new technology all caused con-
siderable anxiety and turbulence that seem
now to have been replaced by greater levels
of public comfort with the “new” economy.
For example, the first part of Chart 9
shows fears rising while unemployment is
flat or improving. This may reflect the rela-
tively inert quality of insecurity. We specu-
late that anxiety and insecurity are more
stubborn than confidence and optimism. In
other words, the lagged quality of perceived
insecurity vis-à-vis the official economy may
not be symmetrical with respect to moving
from good times to bad. People seem to stub-
bornly hold on to their fears but will quick-
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ly abandon confidence. We saw the same
inertia attached to beliefs about the state of
public finances in Canada. This may also be a
unique feature of the Canadian public —
Americans are less insecure, according to our
recent comparison survey, although no more
optimistic.
A Qualitative Check on the
Official/Public Gap
Analysis of these quantitative percep-
tual indicators is of only limited assistance in
solving our problem. Qualitative research
using focus groups is a more subjective or
“phenomenological” tool for deconstructing
relationships in the “lived-in world”
(lebenswelt). By this we mean that we rely
more on the personal accounts and under-
standings of the respondent than on external
measures and analysis of their situation.
TABLE 1
Tracking Views on the Canadian Economy
“Compared to five years ago, do you think that
the Canadian economy is doing much worse,
worse, the same, better, or much better?”
Nov 96 May 00
(n=1535) (n=1505)
Better 45% 56%
Same 24% 24% 
Worse 30% 19%
DK/NR 2% 1% 
Source: Rethinking Government, EKOS Research
Associates Inc.
CHART 7
Fear of Job Loss – Demographic Variations
Percentage of employed Canadians agreeing with
the statement: “I think there’s a good chance I could
lose my job in the next couple of years.”
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measures of job and personal security.
Second, Canadians tend to be highly scep-
tical about the validity of objective macro-
economic indicators. It is our sense that this
scepticism (like the lag and turbulence
effects) was higher in the 1996-98 transi-
tional period than at other times.
In addition to anecdotal observations
of their economic circumstances, the objec-
tive indicator that Canadians point to most
often as evidence of real improvement is
lower unemployment rates. Other key indi-
cators used by economists and reported by
the media, such as inflation rates, stock mar-
ket performance and GDP growth, are less
familiar and relevant to the average person.
Yet even the unemployment rate is
seen as an imperfect indicator of economic
performance. Many people erroneously
assume that it reflects the number of
Canadians who are receiving Employment
Frank L. Graves
Many qualitative studies conducted
by EKOS over the 1990s examined public
perceptions of national and local econom-
ic performance, social well-being and
redistribution (EKOS Research Associates
1997). This research elaborates on the exis-
tence of an imperfect relationship between
objective measures of economic perform-
ance, provided by leading macroeconomic
indicators, and public perceptions of the
state of the economy.
Two key related factors appear to
underlie this apparent distortion. First, peo-
ple tell us that they form their perceptions
about the state of the Canadian economy
based on their personal economic circum-
stances and on examples of local economic
growth. This may help to explain why
media reports of impending economic
70
CHART 8
Perceived Loss of Control Over Personal
Economic Future – Demographic Variations
Percentage of Canadians agreeing with the
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CHART 9
Perceived Loss of Control Over Personal
Economic Future
Percentage of Canadians agreeing with the
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a growing proportion of the workforce that
is ineligible to receive benefits. Many people
also assume that most of the jobs created over
the past 10 years have been low-paying serv-
ice-industry jobs, despite evidence that many
of the jobs created have been well-paying.
Scepticism about the worth of economic
indicators is also linked to Canadians’
increasing distrust of government and elites.
Our qualitative findings suggest that many
Canadians feel that economic indicators are
manipulated by governments with a goal of
maintaining the socio-economic status quo.
Both focus group and survey research
also suggest that Canadians perceive the
fruits of Canada’s recent positive economic
performance to be unevenly distributed.
Focus group participants say the uneven dis-
tribution is masked by most popular indica-
tors, particularly GDP growth rates. As
Chart 4 clearly demonstrates, these concerns
are related to a real and steep rise in income
inequality in the latter part of the decade.
In the mid- to late 1990s, Canadians
had no difficulty reconciling positive eco-
nomic indicators with the view that most
Canadians were no better or worse off than
before. The explanation was that the new
wealth created in the 1990s tended to flow
into the hands of relatively few people while
the majority saw their incomes stagnate. To
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TABLE 2
Tracking Demographic Variables on Perceived Economic Indicators
Feb. 1994 Jan. 2001 Feb. 1994 Jan. 2001
n=2369 n=3099 n=1532 n=2457
Region Region
Atlantic 42 29 Atlantic 52 32
Quebec 41 28 Quebec 33 20
Ontario 45 28 Ontario 45 26
Man./Sask. 49 36 Man./Sask. 51 26
Alberta 46 36 Alberta 46 30
British Columbia 42 34 British Columbia 28 25
Age Age
<25 36 23 <25 42 25
25-44 42 29 25-44 43 25
45-64 50 37 45-64 39 26
65+ 47 31 65+ 38 25
Education Education
=/<HS 47 36 =/<HS 45 28
College 45 28 College 46 24
University 37 26 University 32 23
Gender Gender
Male 38 29 Male 38 25
Female 48 32 Female 45 25
Percentage of Canadians agreeing with the
statement: “I feel I have lost all control over 
my economic future.”
Percentage of employed Canadians 
agreeing with the statement: “I think 
there’s a good  chance I could lose my 
job in the next couple of years.”
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by the evidence (Chart 4). Moreover, many
Canadians felt that while cuts to the social
safety net had allowed Canadian governments
to improve their fiscal situation and bolster
Canada’s international competitiveness, they
had hurt the average family. This helps to
explain why broader perceptual indicators of
social well-being remained stable or even
decreased during the 1990s despite objective
indicators of positive economic performance.
Our most recent survey evidence shows that
this has changed, with most Canadians now
agreeing that their economic circumstances
are better.
It will be helpful to review our exami-
nation of the interplay between the official
and perceived economy in the 1990s by look-
ing at three broad phases — the early, mid-
dle and late 1990s. For this we return to
Charts 1, 2, 5 and 6.
The Early 1990s: Through a
Glass Darkly
The decade began with the country
sliding into what was an unusually deep
and protracted recession. Unemployment
reached well into double digits (Chart 1)
and there was huge downside adjustment,
first in the private sector and then in the
public sector. The economy contracted 3
percent (Chart 2). Interest rates were rela-
tively high and public finances reached
such a desperate state that by the mid-
1990s there was talk of IMF intervention
and Wall Street Journal references likening
Canadian public finances to those of a
“banana republic.” Real per capita dispos-
able income declined until past mid-
decade even while productivity increased,
albeit slowly.
The cumulative weight of this grim
picture produced a sense of gloom and anxi-
ety in the Canadian public, with a stunning
two-thirds of Canadians agreeing with the
bleak proposition that they had lost control
of their economic future (Chart 6) and under
one-quarter feeling comfortable disagreeing.
Similar numbers expressed anxiety over their
personal risk of job loss. All in all, the first
third of the decade concluded with
Canadians’ views on the economy under a
cloud of gloom bordering on despair.
The Mid-1990s: Insecurity
Unhinged
Towards the middle part of the decade
the economy had climbed out of recession
and was demonstrating consistent albeit
rather tepid growth (Chart 2). Canada puta-
tively hit the “fiscal wall” in 1995, and the
crushing combination of huge public deficit
and debt, record-high tax levels and a sector-
limited recovery led most Canadians to dis-
count any claims of recovery by the official
economy. This inertia of public despair and
anxiety continued well into 1997 (Chart 6),
even as the economy continued to recover;
job creation burgeoned and public deficits
were largely arrested and eliminated. This led
us to question why, if GDP was up,
Canadians were so down.
By 1997-98 public confidence was
unhinged and we witnessed wild fluctua-
tions in people’s sense of job security and
broader economic security (Charts 5 and 6).
There was a tendency to largely discount
government claims of fiscal progress,
although public concerns with debt and
deficit did begin to abate. Concern about
public finances had gone from a strong plu-
rality holding the view that the deficit was
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of the 1990s to a pinnacle of public concern
by mid-decade.10
From a qualitative perspective, many
Canadians saw (or experienced) the employ-
ment losses of the first third of the decade
as profound and permanent and the gains
of the middle third as selective and volatile.
For many, there was a virtual collision
between the conclusion to the “old econo-
my” and the awkward, first steps into the
new, which in part explains the unhinging
discussed above. Compounding the impact
of this collision was the speed at which it
took place and the amount of “traffic”
involved. Coinciding with the emergence
of new economic “realities” were the
ground-level impacts of government
retrenchment and broader institutional and
societal shifts. These profoundly inter-relat-
ed, dynamic forces challenged Canadians’
resilience. In a sense, a great number of
Canadians realized that they could not
cling to what they had known (because it
was gone) and had yet to fix in their minds
what the future would hold.
The Close of One Century and
Opening of Another: Fluxophilia
and the New Economy
However, as the 1990s closed and the
new century opened, Canadians could no
longer ignore the sustained strong per-
formance of the Canadian economy.
Aggregate unemployment continued to
drop dramatically (Chart 1), GDP contin-
ued to grow, and the Canadian economy
began to rival and even surpass the
American juggernaut, which had left most
advanced Western economies in its dust
throughout the 1990s. The yawning pro-
ductivity and standard-of-living gap
between Canada and the United States was
stabilized and there was some evidence that
the Canadian economy was beginning to
narrow the American advantage. Moreover,
interest rates remained low and real per
capita disposable income was rising. While
the common perception may be that the
enfeebled Canadian dollar is not part of our
rosy economic picture, the low dollar has in
fact contributed to this success.
Perhaps even more pointedly, the
state of Canadian public finances had been
dramatically reversed. Record deficits were
being replaced by large surpluses at the
senior levels of government. This reversal
is important for two reasons. First, our
research, even up to 1997 and 1998,
showed that most Canadians still believed
the rate of growth of the public debt was
accelerating. Second, and more important-
ly, our multivariate analysis of attitudes
towards government (expectations, trust,
appropriate expenditure levels) showed that
concern over public finances explained as
much and possibly more of the observed
variance than any other single factor
(including perceptions of the broader econ-
omy) (EKOS Research Associates 1995).
Canada had magically transformed itself
from a banana republic into a northern
tiger, leading growth in the G8 and with
sound public finances and the lowest unem-
ployment rates in well over a decade. All of
this occurred against a backdrop of an
almost miraculous new global economy
that appeared poised to repeal the laws of
business cycles and to continue with
unabated growth, floated on the magic car-
pet of globalization, the electronic revolu-
tion and exotic new biotechnologies.
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How does this brave new economy
appear through the prism of public attitudes?
The most recent data suggest that the public
has indeed registered the official success of the
economy, although there are entrenched divi-
sions across class lines as to the extent of this
success. Fear of job loss is well down and sense
of loss of control has been virtually halved from
its mid-1990s apex. It must be noted that
economic insecurity is still fairly volatile and
confidence levels are not firmly entrenched,
particularly amongst certain segments of
Canadian society. Our US-Canada compara-
tive survey shows that although the incidence
of Canadians believing they had lost all con-
trol of their economic future was well down,
it was twice as high as that among Americans
in 1999. In EKOS’s most recent soundings,
however, Canadian insecurity continued to
decline while American insecurity rose almost
10 percentage points on our loss of control indi-
cator (Chart 10).11
There is also a sense that economic
polarization has not decreased as the economy
has rebounded and that, in fact, a widening
and hardening gap between rich and poor is
a permanent feature of the new economy, part
of the price that must be paid for negotiating
a successful strategy to deal with globaliza-
tion.12 It is, however, instructive to note that
while the majority of Canadians believe
poverty is growing and the gap between rich
and poor is widening, the size of this majori-
ty has shrunk over the past two years.
The more impressive evidence is, how-
ever, the breadth of Canadian confidence in
the economy. In late 1997 only slightly more
Canadians believed the economy was better
compared to five years previously than
believed it was worse (Table 1), but in May
2000 the better-to-worse ratio had risen to
nearly 3:1.13 The future looked even brighter
for the majority of Canadians, with only sin-
gle-digit percentages now characterizing
themselves as pessimistic and close to four in
five declaring themselves optimistic about
their personal futures (Chart 11).
Meanwhile, we have seen a dramatic
reversal in attitudes towards globalization,
technology and trade liberalization. In the
early 1990s most Canadians were opposed to
NAFTA, almost none had even heard of the
Internet and new technology was associated
more with risk than with opportunity. In
early 2000 globalization was seen in deci-
sively positive terms, the Internet was seen
as the most powerful agent of positive change
in the lives of the over 60 percent of
Canadians who were online, and further trade
liberalization was supported by the clear
majority of Canadians. Only 4 percent of
Canadians believed that change was mostly
“a bad thing” while 66 percent thought it
was mostly a “good thing” (30 percent were
indifferent or did not know) (EKOS Research
Associates 2000a).
Canadians have emerged from the tur-
bulence and insecurity of the 1990s with a
fundamentally different outlook on the econ-
omy. They have moved from “future shock” to
what we call “fluxophilia” (love of change).
This transformation may represent the emer-
gence of a new postmodern personality. It may
be as significant as the shift in worldview and
values that accompanied the transformation
from mercantilism to industrialism (although
compressed into a tiny fraction of time com-
pared to that great transition).
All of this suggests that the tradition-
al relationships between perceptions of the
economy and attitudes towards government
74
Frank L. Graves
graves.qxd  24/05/01  10:00 AM  Page 74and society may be undergoing a historical
transformation beyond the usual fluctuations
of the business cycle. Within this historical
cauldron, equally profound transformations
in the role of the State and broader institu-
tions are taking place. This sets the stage for
the final questions of our discussion — how
do citizens weigh and balance economic and
social well-being, and how do economic per-
ceptions influence attitudes towards the
redistributive role of the State?
ECONOMY FOR WHAT? THE 
PUBLIC BALANCE OF ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL WELL-BEING
There is a vast philosophical and social
science literature on the notion of well-being.
Our intention is to bypass these intellectual
views and assess public impressions of the rel-
ative importance of economic and social well-
being. In the public consciousness, economic
well-being refers to the amount and security
of one’s income/wealth set against the costs of
necessities and luxuries. Social well-being is a
more complex and elusive concept; for most
people the notion of overall quality of life,
both individual and collective, would come
close to the definition of social well-being.
Our research indicates that members of the
public draw a clear distinction between the
economic and social realms.
Quality of Life Versus Standard
of Living: Dominance of the
Social Realm
As noted above, our research has
revealed a profound gap between the reso-
nance of “standard of living” and that of
“quality of life.” In fact, this gap is at the
essence of the conflict between Canadians’
views of economic policy and indicators such
as productivity growth. In what we have
labelled the “Bay Street variant,” productiv-
ity is primarily linked to improving the
material standard of living and involves a
relatively small tool kit of solutions (chiefly
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CHART 10
Tracking Economic Insecurity





















Source: Rethinking Government, EKOS Research
Associates Inc., US Surveys.
CHART 11
Optimism
“Would you describe yourself as pessimistic or




















Source: CIO Government Communications Surveys,
EKOS Research Associates Inc.
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Research Associates 1999). Formulated in
these narrow, economistic terms, the issue
finds little resonance with Canadians. In the
people’s variant of this agenda, or what we
call the “Main Street variant,” the issue is
constructed around productivity for quality
of life. This objective brings into play a
much expanded tool kit, which, while not
excluding tax cuts, orders and clusters pri-
orities in a more balanced manner, with the
emphasis on human capital (e.g., health,
education, skills, kids).
As discussed in note 4, our focus-group
participants had a great deal of fluency in
these issues and had no trouble discussing
standard of living and quality of life. Most
described standard of living as measurable in
income/assets: “It’s about how much money
you have.” They saw quality of life as a much
broader concept, encompassing a whole range
of potential factors depending on individual
preferences and motivations.
The connection among macroeconomic
performance, standard of living and quality of
life was much debated in our focus groups
held in the early part of 1999. For many, the
extent of the connection for “average people”
like them was determined by government
action (i.e., how it distributes economic bene-
fits throughout society). All participants
believed, for example, that it is quite possible
for an economy to grow while most people see
their standard of living decline if the “rich are
allowed to keep all the profits.” Most partici-
pants believed this may well be what has hap-
pened in Canada. The idea of the rising tide
lifting all (or at least most) boats was seen as
theoretically plausible but did not resonate:
“Not everyone has the same chances to benefit;
some boats are leaky.”
Moving Beyond the Dualism of
Social or Economic Agenda:
The Emerging Humanomic Ethic
Given the two competing models of
Bay Street and Main Street, the majority of
Canadians would line up behind Main Street
on this complex issue. The preferred goal for
Canada in 2010 is to have the “best quality
of life in the world” (Chart 12). It is worth
noting that achieving the highest standard of
living is at the bottom of the list. Indeed, the
top part of the chart is dominated by “soft-
er” goals and the bottom by harder, fiscal
goals. It is not that people do not want more
money — they clearly do — but that they do
not want to define themselves or the society
they pass on to the next generation in purely
pecuniary terms. It is also worth noting that
Canadians are resistant to a purely idealistic-
humanistic societal goal. The bridging of
social and economic concerns can transcend
these false dichotomies.
Canadians do not equate quality of life
with standard of living. Quality of life is
linked to human investment priorities; for
example, there is a strong link between a
healthy population and quality of life. It
should also be noted that there is a strong
positive association between perceived qual-
ity of life and income (Chart 13). It is
remarkable that in research carried out by
EKOS this strong linear relationship seems
to disappear and even reverses itself after
annual income exceeds $150,000.14 This
implies profound questions about the ideal
distribution of wealth in society.
There is also an expressed desire to
explicitly link social and economic policies,
which are now broadly seen to have com-
plementary rather than competing agendas.
In evaluating the current emphasis of
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vailing focus as economic. However,
Canadians register substantial support for a
more balanced or social learning agenda.
DO RISING ECONOMIC TIDES
BOOST COMPASSIONATE ETHIC?
THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE ON ATTITUDES 
TOWARD REDISTRIBUTION
How does the performance of the
economy (both official and perceived) affect
attitudes toward redistribution? In narrow
terms, this could refer to the emphasis
placed on tax burden versus spending
priorities, particularly social assistance,
regional transfers and unemployment
insurance.
We can consider relationships at both
the micro (individual survey respondents)
and macro (aggregate) level. The former
refers to the relationship between an indi-
vidual’s sense of personal economic security
and his or her attitude toward redistribution,
the latter to how aggregate societal attitudes
vary according to official and perceived ups
and downs in the economy. This would be
roughly analogous to the distinction between
an individual’s income and GDP.
In addition to considering the relation-
ship between economic performance and atti-
tudes toward redistribution in the narrower
sense, we have argued that it is essential this
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CHART 12
Preferred Goals for Federal Government
“If you were Prime Minister for a day, and had to
pick an overall national goal for Canada to achieve
by the year 2010, which of the following would you
choose?”
Best health care system in the world
Lowest incidence of child
poverty in the world
Best quality of life in the world
Best educated population
in the world
Highest labour market participation
rate in the world
Lowest overall tax burden of
major industrialized countries




country in the world
Highest standard of living of
industrialized nations











Note: Presented in series of random, paired choices.
Percentages indicate average number of times each
option was selected over all others.




“Thinking about your personal quality of life, do
you think it has gotten better or worse in the past
10 years?”









No response (n= 288)
0
Percentage saying better











1 Four persons in the sample had household incomes of
between $175,000 and $199,999. All of them said that their
personal quality of life had gotten better over the past 10
years. When these responses are added to the previous
household income level, 68 percent of respondents
(n = 16) with incomes of $150,000 to $199,999 say better.
Source: Productivity Study, 1999, EKOS Research
Associates Inc.
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We believe, as do many others, that broader
historical shifts are occurring in terms of basic
values and orientations to the role of the State,
economy and society. These contextual factors
are crucial to an understanding of the simpler
issue of how economic performance influences
attitudes toward redistribution. These revolve
around shifts in expectations and value of the
State and the marketplace.
The Individual Linkage Between
Economic Performance and
Attitudes Toward Redistribution
Before considering macro or societal
linkages, it is helpful to consider the micro or
individual-level linkage between economic
performance and attitudes toward redistribu-
tion. As noted earlier, we extend the analysis
to the broader issue of support for active gov-
ernment. Economic performance is typically
thought of as an aggregate attribute of the
overall (or regional) economy. Individuals can
also demonstrate (and reflect broader) eco-
nomic “performance” (e.g., their personal
income, wealth, productivity, standard of liv-
ing), but this is an unusual usage of the term.
There is, however, a danger in correlating only
the aggregate attributes of a society (as, for
example, in Chart 12). Although these macro
indicators are interesting and useful to exam-
ine in the aggregate, this level of analysis can
disguise the way these relationships function
at the individual level.15
In fact, the micro or individual-level
relationships between economic performance
and attitudes towards redistribution function
very differently from relationships at the
macro or aggregate societal level. For indi-
viduals, there is a striking and predictable
linkage between social class and attitudes
towards government spending. Economically
secure citizens are much less supportive of
redistributive functions and more supportive
of accelerated tax relief than citizens drawn
from economically vulnerable locations with-
in society. This is a reflection of both class
values and interests and corresponds rough-
ly to J.K. Galbraith’s “culture of content-
ment” thesis. The economically secure are
much less likely to need government support
and much more likely to pay more taxes than
the economically vulnerable.
If the macro level followed the same
logic as the micro level, we would expect that
as aggregate perceptions of economic per-
formance (and security) strengthen there will
be more secure people and hence less support
for active State redistribution. In fact this is
not the case. As economic performance has
improved, producing more affluent people,
the appetite for active government has risen,
not declined. Potentially, the discrepancy can
be explained by the notion of “relative dep-
rivation.” More citizens may be affluent, but
the gap between the truly wealthy, who make
up a small percentage of the population, and
the rest of the population may remain the
same or become perceptually even wider.
This provides a vivid illustration of aggrega-
tion bias and a useful segue to the more rele-
vant topic of the aggregate linkage among
societal attitudes toward redistribution, the
State and economic performance.
The Macro Linkages
Canadian society has not become more
resistant to an active role for the State in
social well-being. In fact support for active
government investment has risen impres-
sively over the past five years. This conclu-
sion is clearer when scrutinized against the
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social well-being than against the narrower
criterion of attitudes toward redistribution.
As Table 4 clearly shows, the percent-
age of respondents who say that the federal
government should “increase” its involve-
ment (summed across a broad range of gov-
ernment activities) has risen progressively
(from 39 to 50) since 1995, while the per-
centage who say that government should
“reduce or eliminate” its involvement has
declined from 25 to 10. These clear (monot-
onic) patterns correspond fairly directly to
rising confidence in personal and national
economic performance.
Redistribution, in the narrower form
of passive income supports and regional
wealth transfers, has suffered stagnant or
declining support over the past 20 years.
This decline in support is associated with
broad post-material shifts (e.g., from col-
lectivism to individualism), declining trust
in and expectations of government, and a
growing belief that the parental welfare
state had the irony of perpetuating the very
problems it sought to solve. The shifting
metaphor of the social safety net as a ham-
mock, encouraging indolence and abuse, is
evident in current political (and popular)
beliefs.
Less obviously, this decline in sup-
port for the progressive redistributive State
has not been replaced by the neo-conserva-
tive ethic of radical self-reliance, minimal
government and trickle-down economics.
These approaches have, if anything, been
even more decisively eschewed by citizens
who seek a more pragmatic and effective
strategy for achieving social well-being.
This points to the centrality of human cap-
ital investment, in concert with explicit
attention to fiscal prudence and sound eco-
nomic management, as the key to securing
stable quality of life. When it is cast in
these terms, we can see rising support for
a “conditionally active” State as the econ-
omy strengthens.
To empirically illustrate these argu-
ments, we will conclude by reviewing
shifting public values and attitudes
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TABLE 3
Allocation of Budget Surplus
“As you may know, the government in Ottawa
has said it will have a budget surplus over the
next several years. How would you prefer the



















Atlantic 63 17 18
Quebec 57 18 23
Ontario 52 28 20
Man./Sask. 47 24 27
Alberta 44 34 21
British Columbia 45 29 26
Household Income
<$20,000 64 18 17
$20,000-$39,999 56 22 21
$40,000-$59,999 48 28 23
$60,000-$79,999 45 32 22
$80,000-$99,999 47 28 24
=>$100,000 41 29 27
“I Feel I Have Lost All 
Control Over My 
Economic Future.”
Economically 
secure 51 28 20
Economically 
insecure 55 20 24
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the past decade. We will review four key
indicators:
> changes, over the past several years, in
the call for increase/maintenance or
decrease/elimination of federal govern-
ment activities (Table 4; Chart 14);
> public ratings of fiscal and social pri-
orities for the federal government
during the 1990s (Chart 15);
> specific reactions to a trickle-down
strategy versus increased investment
concerning child poverty in light of
increased prosperity (Chart 16);
> shifts, over the past several years, in
preferred broad role orientations for
government (Chart 17).
Conditional Receptivity to New
Activism: An Increased or
Decreased Role for
Government?
Despite deep scepticism about the
effectiveness, efficiency and fairness of gov-
ernment, Canadians are now clearly looking
for a return to an active agenda. Reduced
fears over public finances, growing concerns
about the social costs of retrenchment and
globalization, and a desire to preserve a
unique Canadian identity are all fuelling
guarded acceptance of a greater role for gov-
ernments in general and the federal govern-
ment in particular. Most recently, rising
levels of economic optimism have reinforced
this “active shift.”
One of the crucial questions here is what
is the relative role of the economy in this rise
in support for government involvement? Is it
reduced fears over public finances, a sense that
social needs have worsened or that public
largesse is less constrained by economic fears?
Our research suggests that all of these factors
are at play, and our multivariate models indi-
cate separate effects for each. In the aggregate,
however, it appears that economic confidence
may be the most crucial factor.
In the past few years we have seen
Canadian public opinion stabilize at a con-
sensus that both senior levels of government
should increase or maintain their level of
involvement across all policy areas (Table
4).16 In fact, as economic confidence has risen
the emphasis on “increase” involvement has
continued while that on “eliminate or
reduce” involvement has lessened dramati-
cally. In the past when we randomly used the
word “spending” instead of “involvement”
we achieved the same result.
Chart 14 breaks down the increase/
decrease test for health care, education and
unemployment. These specific tests focus on
both redistribution (unemployment) and
broader active investment measures (e.g.,
health care and education). They also include
areas that are seen as worsening (health care)




Future Federal Government Involvement
Across All Priorities
“Overall what would you like to see the federal
government do in the future?”
1995 1996 1997 1998 2001
Increase 39% 39% 48% 46% 50%
involvement
Maintain 34% 42% 40% 42% 38%
involvement
Decrease 18% 13% 9%  9% 8%
involvement
Eliminate 7% 7% 2% 2% 2%
involvement
Source: Rethinking Government, EKOS Research
Associates Inc.
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tions versus economic performance.
In the case of unemployment (an area
of declining need), the incidence of “increase”
dropped by 10 percentage points between
1997 and 2001. It must be noted, however,
that the increase figure is still significantly
higher in 2001 (at 51 percent) than it was in
1995 (at 40 percent). This suggests that both
social conditions and economic performance
influence attitudes towards redistribution. In
the case of health care, our measures of per-
ceived need show that Canadians do believe
needs have risen rapidly since 1995 due to
perceived deterioration in the system.
However, the incidence of perceived deterio-
ration, while still high, has actually been
dropping significantly over the past year.
Meanwhile, support for increased involve-
ment continues to rise. Once again, this sug-
gests that both need and economic
performance are important but that the econ-
omy may be a more significant factor.
Fiscal Versus Active Priorities
When we asked an identically phrased
question about what priority the federal gov-
ernment should assign to “level of taxation”
against other issues such as unemployment
and debt, we found it registered low as a
public concern (Chart 15). These patterns
have continued into 2001 and are reinforced
by other evidence and numerous other tests.
There has been a consistent and pro-
gressive pattern, since the mid-1990s, of
declining concern with level of taxation (now
cited as a priority for government by only 62
percent of Canadians, versus 92 percent for
health and 87 percent for child poverty). At
the same time, we are finding evidence of ris-
ing concern in other areas (Chart 16) and
increased receptivity to the need for govern-
ment to play a role in addressing problems in
our collective life. We are also seeing a fairly
strong rejection of trickle-down economics.
The public’s desire for a return to
active government is, however, highly con-
ditional. The public resists a return to old-
style government and seeks a new approach
that stresses targets, results measurement, fis-
cal discipline and partnerships. The public
does not want to reduce the government’s
role to that of accountant. They want gov-
ernment to help plan, coordinate and protect.
Despite their reservations, Canadians still
want government to deal with the really big
problems that are too onerous for them to
manage on their own. Children, the next
generation and the widening gap between
rich and poor are some of the issues that
Canadians are deeply concerned about and do
not believe will be adequately managed
through tax cuts or minimal government.
Chart 17 shows the most recent role
hierarchy for government, noting changes
from five years earlier. Canadians espouse a
mix of liberal and conservative roles for the
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1995 1997 1996 1998 2001
% indicating “increase involvement”
Health Care Education Unemployment
Source: Rethinking Government, EKOS Research
Associates Inc.
graves.qxd  24/05/01  10:00 AM  Page 81federal government. The continued (and
recently declining) low ranking of minimal
government, in contrast to the high
ranking accorded a government role in pro-
moting full employment and tolerance and
understanding, reflects a desire for active
government.
Note that the public’s hierarchy is
dominated by active roles. At the bottom of
the list is minimal government. Equality roles
(based on redistribution) are also rated low, as
are values linked to wealth and competitive-
ness. This indicates the danger of focusing on
attitudes towards redistribution as a bell-
wether for attitudes towards government
involvement when discussing Canadians’
views of their economic and social well-being.
One of our core conclusions is that the
economy is very important but that the
economy and economic values are seen
as instrumental, not terminal, values.
Economic values like thrift, productivity
and competitiveness are seen as tools for the
achievement of higher-order, humanistic
goals (e.g., a healthy population, freedom,
a clean environment). We believe that the
idea of “humanomics” will help to capture
this rising sentiment.
“Humanomics”
Although another neologism to describe
government is probably not an urgent need,
we believe that the label humanomics can help
describe a growing public desire for an eco-
nomic approach that recognizes both the cen-
trality of real-world human results (e.g.,
improved health, skills and quality of life) and
human-resource inputs (e.g., improved
human-capital investments in health and edu-
cation) as a means to achieve these results.
Humanomics is a blending of social invest-
ment and hard economic priorities, with gov-
ernment serving as a strategic broker among
citizens, the private sector and institutions.




Longer-Term Tracking of Federal Priorities
“Thinking not just of today but over the next five
years, what priority should the federal government
place on each of the following areas?”
unemployment level of taxation





























Note: % indicating high priority (5,6, 7 on a 7-point
scale) “debt and deficit” replaced by “debt and public
finances” in January, 1998.
Source: Children’s Survey, January 2000, Rethinking
Government, EKOS Research Associates Inc.
CHART 16
Concern for Others
Now that the economy is getting stronger, we no
longer need to worry as much about child poverty issues
Now that the economy is getting stronger, we can now











Source: Rethinking Government, Nov. 97 & HRDC Child
Poverty Survey, Oct. 97, EKOS Research Associates Inc.
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social policy as components of an overall plan
to increase opportunity and reduce economic
risks, rather than as competitors for scarce
societal resources. Citizens believe that
humanism and economics can be synthesized
to transcend some of the excesses and divisions
that have characterized the traditional left-
right focus. We believe the notion of huma-
nomics can also help solve the paradox of how
it can be “the economy, stupid!” when all of
the government’s priorities and top-rated val-
ues are humanistic concerns.
Despite the allure of a new humanom-
ic State, deep divisions underlie the potential
consensus for such a model. The rapid social,
economic and cultural changes of the late
20th century have fostered the emergence of
an incipient underclass in Canada, along with
deep disagreements amongst the economi-
cally comfortable classes.
This analysis suggests that the ongoing
fluctuations in the economy will continue to
have a profound impact on the debate,
although that impact will be less predictable
in future. The recent federal election was
probably the first campaign in what will be
an intense “vision” war to rebalance the roles
of the economy, society and the State.
Although the performance of the economy
will continue to strongly influence the out-
come, there are reasons to believe that a less
deferential, more sophisticated postmodern
citizenry will ultimately demand that it be
given the final say.
NOTES
The core conclusions in this article are based in
part on the thesis developed in Graves (1999).
Although as the author I am ultimately respon-
sible for any errors, I share any credit with a num-
ber of colleagues. At EKOS, Andrew Sullivan and
Sheila Redmond were especially helpful in assem-
bling the literature and background analysis.
Christian Boucher, Norm Leckie, Manon
DesGroseilliers and Patrick Beauchamp all pro-
vided additional useful input. Alfred MacLeod
bravely presented a rough draft to the initial
authors’ symposium, at which point we received
helpful feedback from other participants and
from the editors. Richard Jenkins provided very
insightful commentary as the discussant, for
which I am grateful. Finally, I thank the hun-
dreds of thousands of Canadians who patiently
endured our surveys and focus-group sessions
during the 1990s.
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CHART 17
Tracking Future Roles for Federal
Government
“For each of the following, I would like you to rate
how appropriate you think that each would be as a
future role for the federal government.”
Mean score on a 100- point scale where
100 indicates “extremely appropriate”
Building a country that can
be a source of pride
Planning for future generations
Protecting Canadians
from crime and abuse
Ensuring full employment
Demonstrating accountability




Providing Canadians with strategic
information about training*
Redistributing wealth in order
to promote social equality




















Source: Rethinking Government, July 2000, EKOS
Research Associates Inc.
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ion varies in regular, predictable ways. This view
is not without its detractors, who argue that the
fit between objective and subjective economic vari-
ables is less reliable than commonly assumed. See,
for example, the articles in Clark et al. (1992a).
2 This does not necessarily indicate that the more
highly educated members of a society always
respond to economic indicators in an objective
fashion. For example, Krause (1997) questions
the use of aggregated public opinion data to
determine relationships between the economy
and economic expectations — that is, personal
financial and/or sociotropic expectations con-
cerning the economy. When disaggregated, the
data show that those with high school education
or less were uninfluenced by “expectational”
cycles — that is, their personal financial expec-
tations mirrored actual economic conditions —
whereas among those with at least one under-
graduate degree there was a difference between
real economic conditions and personal and
sociotropic financial expectations. This finding is
consistent across virtually all of our indicators of
economic performance, optimism and security,
with more affluent Canadians as well as those
with higher levels of education declaring them-
selves to be more bullish not only about their
own situations but also about the state of the
country, its finances and its future prospects. It
should be noted that Krause looks at disaggrega-
tion by education level only.
3 This is supported by EKOS’s Rethinking
Government series.
4 In the qualitative component of EKOS Research
Associates (1999), focus-group participants were
asked whether they discerned a difference
between “standard of living” and “quality of life.”
Consistent with the quantitative findings, they
saw quality of life as far higher in priority and
encompassing a host of factors including standard
of living, emotional, physical and spiritual well-
being, a clean environment and active govern-
ment supports.
5 There appears to be a threshold effect in the rela-
tionship between social variables and economic
growth. In underdeveloped countries an increase
in economic growth is matched by a dramatic rise
in social indicators such as birth rate and employ-
ment, whereas in developed countries a similar
increase in economic growth is not matched by a
comparable jump in social indicators. One can
extrapolate that in a functioning democracy the
public takes high growth rates for granted in
assessing quality of life and therefore, after a “bad
economic spell,” sees conditions as merely return-
ing to expected levels. See Krause (1997) and
Fedderke and Klitgaard (1998).
6 Social indicators are broadly understood to include
life expectancy, physician-to-population ratio,
availability of education, suicide and homicide
rates, energy consumption, etc. There are sugges-
tions that a web of associations amongst social
indicators might play a role in economic growth,
but there is little theoretical understanding of this
role. Most social indicators are proxies for difficult-
to-measure attributes. They seem to be more con-
sistently and strongly associated with level of
change than with rate of change in per capita
GDP. It may well be that the rate of change in
GDP and other objective economic indicators have
little bearing on changes in public opinion on
social issues (cultural indicators), as changes in
these areas are caused by other factors not strictly
related to economic indicators. Therefore a lag
between an improved economy and public per-
ception of improving social conditions or social
variables is not all that surprising. See Fedderke
and Klitgaard (1998).
7 The more influential literature in this area includes
Nye, Zelikow and King (1997), Inglehart (1990),
Nevitte (1996) and Giddens (1998).
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measures is evident across many areas of social pol-
icy, it is particularly marked in the field of labour
markets. After extensively tracking Canadian atti-
tudes towards Employment Insurance (and its
predecessor, Unemployment Insurance) through-
out the 1990s, we now find a 20 percent advan-
tage for those who believe EI should act as a
springboard for the unemployed to return to work
over those who believe it should be used, for
instance, to stabilize the economy during periods
of recession. See EKOS Research Associates
(2000a).
9 One might speculate that the lag is indicative of
a transition period in the learning processes of a
public embarking on a positive relationship with
globalization and the new economy, equivalent
to that in emerging marketplace economies. The
evidence in this article is for the existence of this
lag and the emergence of a new way of looking at
the economy and its interplay with social factors.
Anderson and O’Connor (2000) describe the
learning process concerning economic indicators
that took place during the first five years of East
Germany’s marketplace economy after destruc-
tion of the Berlin Wall and reunification with
West Germany, with East Germans’ perceptions
of the economy gradually becoming aligned with
the objective economy.
10 The February 1994 issue of Rethinking Government
reported that 47 percent of Canadians agreed that
“recent concern about the deficit was manufac-
tured by large businesses and wealthy Canadians”
and just 27 percent disagreed.
11 This finding supports the findings of the
Conference Board’s Consumer Confidence Index
referred to earlier. See Conference Board (2001).
12 While in 1996 some 81 percent of Canadians
were worried Canada was moving “increasingly
to a society of haves and have-nots,” by July 2000
the figure had stabilized at 75 percent. In relat-
ed qualitative research conducted as a component
of the Rethinking Government studies, participants
viewed this phenomenon with a sense of resigna-
tion, with a disenfranchised underclass as the
unfortunate by-product of international compet-
itiveness.
13 These findings are explored in depth in EKOS
Research Associates (2000b). However, it should
be noted that this information was gathered
before news of the current slowdown in the
United States broke.
14 While the number reporting that their quality of
life has improved over a 10-year period rises with
income, this trend levels off and then in fact
reverses at $150,000 per annum. See EKOS
Research Associates (1999).
15 The problem of potential discrepancies between
correlating aggregate and individual-level data is
discussed in the literature under the rubric of
aggregation bias (either “ecological” or “psycho-
logical fallacies”).
16 Respondents were asked to indicate whether the
federal government (and the provincial govern-
ment, separately) should “increase,” “maintain,”
“reduce” or “eliminate” its involvement in a series
of 20 different policy areas. The findings dis-
cussed here are based on the aggregate responses
of respondents across all individual policy areas
explored in the question.
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